摘要：

Wicklund and Gollwitzer make two claims that the distinction between public and private self-awareness/self-consciousness is "Aristotelian," and that the distinction is fallacious For the distinction to be Aristotelian, as Wicklund and Gollwitzer use that term, requires that the distinction not be embedded in a "process" model of behavior Thus, the first claim is easily shown to be false The second claim rests on a variety of empirical and theoretical issues An examination of these issues reveals ( a ) that Wicklund and Gollwitzer's alternative interpretations for public self-attention effects are themselves Aristotelian—involving labels but no processes, ( b ) that their citation of literature relevant to their case is highly selective and misleading, and ( c ) that their abolition of the public-private distinction would leave an embarrassing contradiction among self-awareness effects, which Wicklund and Gollwitzer apparently are unable to address The vast preponderance of evidence thus supports the utility and the importance of the public-private self-focus distinction

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